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Bilateralists hold that the meanings of the connectives are determined by rules
of inference for their use in deductive reasoning with asserted and denied formu-
las. This paper presents two bilateral connectives comparable to Prior’s tonk,
for which, unlike for tonk, there are reduction steps for the removal of maximal
formulas arising from introducing and eliminating formulas with those connec-
tives as main operators. Adding either of them to bilateral classical logic results
in an incoherent system. One way around this problem is to count formulas as
maximal that are the conclusion of reductio and major premise of an elimina-
tion rule and to require their removability from deductions. The main part of
the paper consists in a proof of a normalisation theorem for bilateral logic. The
closing sections address philosophical concerns whether the proof provides a sat-
isfactory solution to the problem at hand and confronts bilateralists with the
dilemma that a bilateral notion of stability sits uneasily with the core bilateral
thesis.
1 Introduction
It is a commonly held view that the meanings of the expressions of a language are
determined by the use its speakers make of them. One way of giving substance
to this view is to propose that that use can be systematised for the hypothetical
project of constructing a theory of meaning for a language in terms of the conditions
of the correct assertibility of sentences containing the expressions. This is the course
taken by Dummett [2, 3]. Bilateralism, by contrast, is the view that the meanings of
expressions are determined not only in terms of the conditions for the correct assert-
ibility of sentences containing them, but by these in tandem with the conditions for
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their correct deniability. The view was proposed in response to Dummett by Price,
who ‘takes the fundamental notion for a recursive theory of sense to be not assertion
conditions alone, but these in conjunction with rejection, or denial conditions’ [20,
162]. We may distinguish the two views by calling the former unilateralism.
Unilateralism and bilateralism provide alternative forms for a theory of meaning
for an entire language, but I will here only consider their restrictions to the logical
constants of propositional logic. In that region of language, Dummett’s insights
coupled with important contributions by Prawitz have lead to the development of
proof-theoretic semantics, an alternative to truth-theoretic semantics. Whereas in
the latter the meanings of the logical constants are given in terms of their contri-
butions to the truth conditions of sentences containing them, the principal tenet of
proof-theoretic semantics is that their meanings are determined by the use of such
sentences in deductive arguments.
In this paper I will present a problem for bilateral proof-theoretic semantics in
the form of bilateral connectives that are comparable to Prior’s tonk. But whereas
tonk can be excluded from unilateral logic on principled grounds that form part
of the philosophical background of proof-theoretic semantics, the issue is more in-
volved in the case of bilateralism. The main part of the paper contains a proof of
a normalisation theorem for a system of bilateral classical logic. This provides a
solution of sorts to the problem, but it also has certain philosophical drawbacks. In
particular, the proof appeals to an unrestricted version of a bilateral principle of
non-contradiction, while Rumfitt requires this principle to be restricted to atomic
premises. Secondly, the solution is based on a redefinition of the notion of a maxi-
mal formula, and it may be objected that the solution therefore merely constitutes
a change of subject. I conclude that it would appear that the best solution appeals
to bilateral analogues of Prawitz’s inversion principle. These are desirable in any
case and for independent reasons. Appeal to such principles, however, endangers
the core thesis of bilateralism and threatens collapse it into unilateralism.
2 A System of Bilateral Classical Logic
Proof-theoretic semantics along Dummett’s and Prawitz’s lines arguably does not
go any further than intuitionist logic. From their perspective, the rules governing
classical negation are defective. Advocates of bilateralism claim that this situation
is rectified in their framework. They recommend the use of systems of natural de-
duction with two kinds of rules: For each connective c, there are assertive rules
specifying the grounds for and consequences of asserting a formula with c as main
operator, and rejective rules specifying the grounds for and consequences of denying
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such a formula. The most prominent such system has been proposed by Rumfitt
[22], building on work by Smiley [23].1 Rumfitt’s system is intended to satisfy Dum-
mett’s requirements for when the rules of inference governing a connective specify
its meaning: they do so if they are in harmony or, more precisely, stable [1, Chapters
11-13]. The aim is to provide ‘a direct specification of the senses of the connectives
in terms of their deductive use’ [22, 805], where the premises and conclusions of rules
of inference are assertions and denials.
Formulas in the system B of bilateral classical logic are signed by +, indicating
asserted formulas, or ≠, indicating denied ones. ‹ indicates the incoherence that
arises from asserting and denying the same formula. Deductions do not begin with
‹. Lower case Greek letters –, — range over signed formulas, „ may also be ‹. –ú
designates the result of reversing –’s sign from + to ≠ or conversely. The terminology
follows Rumfitt, and the rules of B are his [22, 800 ].
Deductions in B have the familiar tree shape, with the (discharged or undis-
charged) assumptions at the top-most nodes or leaves and the conclusion at the
bottom-most node or root. Every assumption in a deduction belongs to an assump-
tion class, marked by a natural number, di erent numbers for di erent assumption
classes. Formula occurrences of di erent types must belong to di erent assumption
classes. Formula occurrences of the same type may, but do not have to, belong to
the same assumption class. Discharge of assumptions is marked by a square bracket
around the formula: [–]i, where i is a label for the assumption class to which –
belongs. If the assumption is discharged, the label is repeated at the application
of the rule. The formulas in an assumption class are discharged all together or not
at all. Empty assumption classes are permitted for vacuous discharge, when a rule
that allows for the discharge of assumptions is applied with no assumptions being
discharged. The conclusion of a deduction is said to depend on the undischarged
assumptions of the deduction. Similar terminology is applied to subdeductions of
deductions.
Upper case Greek letters  ,  ,  , possibly with subscripts or superscripts, de-
note deductions. Often some of the assumptions and the conclusion of the deduction
are mentioned explicitly at the top and bottom of  ,  ,  . Using the same des-
ignation more than once to denote subdeductions of a deduction means that these
subdeductions are exact duplicates of each other except that assumption classes may
be di erent: the deductions have the same structure, and at every node formulas of
the same type are premises and conclusions of applications of the same rules.2
Definition 1 (Deduction in B).
1Humberstone proposed a similar system at the same time as Rumfitt [10].
2The layout of natural deduction used here follows [25].
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(i) The formula occurrence + A n is a deduction in B of + A from the undischarged
assumption + A, and ≠ A n is one of ≠ A from the undischarged assumption ≠ A,
where n marks the assumption class to which + A, ≠ A belong.
(ii) If  ,  ,   are deductions in B, then so are the following, where the conclusion
depends on the undischarged assumptions of  ,  ,   except those in assumption




+ B+ · I: + A · B
 
+ A · B+ · E: + A
 
+ A · B
+ B
 
≠ A≠ · I: ≠ A · B
 
≠ B
≠ A · B
 







≠ · E: i,j
„
 
+ A+ ‚ I: + A ‚ B
 
+ B
+ A ‚ B
 












≠ B≠ ‚ I: ≠ A ‚ B
 
≠ A ‚ B≠ ‚ E: ≠ A
 




+ B+ ∏ I: i+ A ∏ B
 
+ A ∏ B
 




≠ B≠ ∏ I: ≠ A ∏ B
 
≠ A ∏ B≠ ∏ E: + A
 
≠ A ∏ B
≠ B
 
≠ A+¬I: + ¬A
 




+ A≠¬I: ≠ ¬A
 








(iii) Nothing else is a deduction in B.
Rumfitt calls reductio and non-contradiction co-ordination principles. They have
the character of structural rules required by the formal framework of bilateral logic
to regulate the interaction between +, ≠ and ‹.3
According to Rumfitt, non-contradiction must be restricted to atomic premises
[22, 815f]. His reason is that on a bilateral account of meaning, only the atomic
sentences are co-ordinated primitively by non-contradiction: it is a consequence of
how their use is specified in terms of the conditions of their correct assertibility and
deniability. That the complex sentences are also so co-ordinated is a consequence
of co-ordination at the atomic level and how the meanings of the connectives are
specified by their assertive and rejective rules. By contrast, I will not impose this
restriction on non-contradiction.
It is generally considered to be a necessary requirement for a system of natural
deduction to be satisfactory from the perspective of proof-theoretic semantics that
deductions in it normalise. In unilateral logic, a deduction is in normal form if it
contains no maximal formulas, where a maximal formula is one that is the conclu-
sion of an introduction rule and major premise of an elimination rule for its main
connective. This definition carries over to B, only that maximal formulas are signed
by + or ≠. In section 4 it will be shown that such formulas, and further undesirable
ones, can indeed be removed from deductions in B. The proof of this more general
result requires the unrestricted version of non-contradiction.
3An alternative version of reductio avoids the use of ‹: from  , –ú „ — and  , –ú „ —ú, infer
 ,   „ –. An intuitionist bilateral logic has been formalised in [12]. It fulfils the requirements
Rumfitt imposes on a satisfactory bilateral logic, and hence the claim that only classical bilateral
logic can do so is false. For an informal argument against the view that bilateralism inevitably leads
to classicism, see [13]. The stipulation that nothing can be both asserted and denied addresses the
problem with negation in intuitionist logic noted in [11].
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3 Some Principles of Proof-Theoretic Semantics
Proof-theoretic semantics has its roots in a comment of Gentzen’s, who formulated
the rudiments of a theory of meaning for the connectives:
The introductions constitute, so to speak, the “definitions” of the sym-
bols concerned, and the eliminations are in the end only consequences
thereof, which could be expressed thus: In the elimination of a sym-
bol, the formula in question, whose outer symbol it concerns, may only
“be used as that which it means on the basis of the introduction of this
symbol”. [8, 189]
Gentzen’s comment is the foundation of Prawitz’s inversion principle: ‘an elimi-
nation rule is, in a sense, the inverse of the corresponding introduction rule: by an
application of an elimination rule one essentially only restores what had already been
established if the major premise of the application was inferred by an application of
an introduction rule [...;] nothing is “gained” by inferring a formula through intro-
duction for use as a major premiss in an elimination.’ [19, 33f] Prawitz proposes the
normalisability of deductions as a formal criterion for when the inversion principle
is met.
According to Dummett, the meanings of expressions are determined by two as-
pects of their use, their contributions to the grounds for asserting sentences in which
they occur and to the consequences of asserting such sentences [1, 211 ]. The con-
nectives are a particularly clear cases of how this insight may be applied. The
introduction rules for a connective specify the canonical grounds for deriving a for-
mula with that connective as main operator, and its elimination rules specify the
canonical consequences that follow from such a formula. For the rules governing a
connective to determine its meaning completely, the two aspects of their use must
be stable.
Prawitz’s inversion principle captures the thought that the elimination rules for
a connective c should not licence the deduction of more formulas from a formula
with c as main operator than are justified by the grounds of its assertion as specified





The elimination rule of tonk licences the derivation of too many consequences from







The rules for tonk do not satisfy Prawitz’s inversion principle.
Prawitz’s inversion principle is not enough for meaning-theoretical purposes.
Consider a connective with the introduction rule of conjunction but only one of its
elimination rules. Something is missing: its elimination rule does not permit the
use of the connective in all the ways one should be able to use it relative to its
introduction rule.
Prawitz’s inversion principles spells out the notion of harmony. Dummett’s no-
tion of stability consists in harmony together with a suitable convers. The latter,
as Moriconi and Tesconi note [17, 111], is provided by an inversion principle of
Negri’s and von Plato’s: ‘Whatever follows from the direct grounds for deriving a
proposition must follow from the proposition’ [18, 6]. The elimination rules for a
connective should licence the deduction of all the consequences from a formula with
that connective as main operator that are justified relative to its introduction rules.4
Notice that tonk satisfies Negri’s and von Plato’s inversion principle: whatever
follows from the direct grounds for deriving AtonkB follows from AtonkB. Conse-
quently, as Prawitz’s inversion principle is tied to normalisation, it is a notion in-
teresting enough to be considered by itself, whereas a suitable converse of Prawitz’s
inversion principle, such as Negri’s and von Plato’s, is usually considered only in
combination with Prawitz’s.
If both inversion principles are satisfied, stability obtains and the elimination
rules for a connective license the deduction of all and only the consequences from a
sentence with the connective as main operator that are justified by the grounds for
deriving it as specified by its introduction rules.
4 Bilateral Dissonance
Consider the connective conk:










conk means trouble. Given reductio, the assertion of any formula follows from the
assertion of any formula:




≠ A + A
‹
+ AconkB 1+ B
The denial of any formula also follows from the denial of any formula:
1+ AconkB
+ A ≠ A
‹
≠ AconkB 1≠ B
Notice that conk permits the restriction of non-contradiction to atomic premises.
Next consider the connective honk:










honk, too, means trouble. Given reductio, the assertion of any formula follows from
the denial of any formula:
1≠ AhonkB
+ A ≠ A
‹
+ AhonkB 1+ B
The denial of any formula follows from the assertion of any formula:
1+ AhonkB
≠ A + A
‹
≠ AhonkB 1≠ B
honk also permits the restriction of non-contradiction to atomic premises.
The rules for conk and honk appear to be just as good as the rules for the connec-
tives of B. They combine old rules in novel ways. Like tonk, conk combines rules for
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conjunction and disjunction, only this time they are bilateral rules and all assertive
rules for conjunction and all rejective rules for disjunction are used. honk combines
the rejective rules for implication with assertive rules that would be correct for an-
other connective. But unlike tonk, conk and honk have the rather unusual feature
that although adding them to B gives an incoherent system, maximal formulas that
arise from concluding AconkB or AhonkB by an introduction rule and using them
as major premises of an elimination rule may be removed from deductions by the
same reduction procedures that remove such maximal formulas with conjunction,
disjunction or implication as main connectives.
The rules for the connectives of B satisfy bilateral versions of the inversion
principles. The assertive elimination rules for a connective of B license the deduction
of all and only the consequences from an asserted sentence with the connective as
main operator that are justified by the grounds for deriving it as specified by its
assertive introduction rules. The rejective elimination rules for a connective of B
licence the deduction of all and only the consequences from a denied sentence with
the connective as main operator that are justified by the grounds for deriving it as
specified by its rejective introduction rules. Unlike tonk, the rules for conk and honk
also satisfy these bilateral inversion principles.5
It is evident where the problem lies. In the bilateral framework, it is not enough
that inversion principles balance the grounds and consequences of asserting a formula
and others balance the grounds and consequences of denying a formula. There also
needs to be a sort of stability between the assertive and the rejective rules for a
connective, a kind of inversion that balances the grounds and consequences of the
assertion and the denial of a formula.
The issue can also be put in terms of the question why the rejective and the
assertive rules for a connective of B are rules for the same connective. What is it,
for instance, that makes the assertive rules for the symbol · and the rejective rules
for the symbol · rules for conjunction? What justifies the use of the same symbol in
both cases? We are, of course, able to recognise that the two sets of rules are intended
to be rules for the same connective. But this depends on our previous understanding
of the connectives, while the aim was to specify their meanings completely in terms
of the rules governing them. It should not be down to our grasp of their meanings
that we can recognise which rules belong to which connective, but solely down to
5Gabbay has also proposed a connective that satisfies the bilateral inversion principles but leads
to incoherence [7]. conk and honk, however, are worse than Gabbay’s connective, as they satisfy
an additional requirement concerning the proper subformulas of premises and conclusions of rules
of inference. An exposition of the precise nature of this requirement and why it may reasonably be
imposed on rules that are to determine the meanings of the connectives they govern completely is
the subject of a piece currently in preparation.
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the meaning-theoretical framework. Without addressing this question, bilateralists
cannot claim that the meanings of the connectives of B are determined completely
by the rules of inference governing them, and should this be their objective, they
have no right to use the same symbol in the two sets of rules governing a connective.
Inversion principles that link the assertive and the rejective rules for a connective
would answer the question raised in the previous paragraphs. There is, however,
also another possible diagnosis of what has gone wrong in the four deductions,
and this leads to a result of independent interest. In each of them, a complex
formula is the conclusion of reductio and major premise of an elimination rule.
Reductio provides grounds for the assertion and denial of formulas. These should be
in harmony with the consequences of asserting and denying them as specified by the
respective elimination rules for their main connective. This motivates the demand
that formulas that are conclusion of reductio and major premise of an elimination
rule should be removable from deductions.
Furthermore, inferences by non-contradiction draw consequences from formulas
which should be in harmony with the grounds for deriving them. Finally, reduc-
tio and non-contradiction should presumably be in harmony with each other, too,
although this has nothing to do with the connectives, but rather with the formal
framework of bilateral logic.
These formulas also count as maximal in the normalisation theorem for deduc-
tions in B that is proved in the next section.
5 Normalisation for B
This section contains a proof of a normalisation theorem for deductions in B.6
Definition 2. The degree of a signed formula + A or ≠ A is the number of connec-
tives occurring in A.
‹ is not a signed formula and gets degree 0.
Definition 3. A maximal signed formula is an occurrence of a formula in a deduction
that is one of the following:
(a) conclusion of an introduction rule and major premise of an elimination rule;
6The reader is invited to compare it with Stålmarck’s proof of normalisation for unilateral
classical logic [24]. There is some resemblance, if ≠ is read as negation. However, as B has a larger
number of operational rules than Stålmarck’s system, certain complications that arise in Stålmarck’s
proof do not arise here. In particular, there is no need to consider assumption contractions separately
from reduction steps for maximal formulas. The larger number of rules also requires reduction steps
for which there are no equivalents in Stålmarck’s proof.
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(b) conclusion of reductio and major premise of an elimination rule;
(c) conclusion of reductio and premise of non-contradiction;
(d) conclusion of an introduction rule and premise of non-contradiction the other
premise of which is also the conclusion of an introduction rule.
For brevity, I will mostly use ‘maximal formula’ instead of ‘maximal signed formula’.
To distinguish the four kinds of maximal formulas, I will call those of kind
(a) maximal formulas with introduction and elimination rules or i/e maximal for-
mulas; those of kind (b) maximal formulas with reductio and elimination rules or
r/e maximal formulas; those of kind (c) maximal formulas with reductio and non-
contradiction or r/nc maximal formulas; and those of kind (d) maximal formulas
with introduction rules and non-contradiction or i/nc maximal formulas.
Formulas of the third and fourth kind are clearly ‘maximal’ in some sense, even
though the philosophical reasons for requiring the removability of maximal formulas
of the first (and perhaps the second) kind may not apply to them. They have been in-
cluded here to ensure that deductions in normal form have the subformula property.
For Rumfitt, i/nc maximal formulas do not arise, as he restricts non-contradiction
to atomic premises. The reduction steps to remove r/e maximal formulas where the
elimination rule is + ‚ E or ≠ · E require the general version of non-contradiction.
Definition 4 (Segment, Length and Degree of a Segment, Maximal Segment).
(a) A segment is a sequence of two or more formula occurrences C1 . . . Cn in a
deduction such that C1 is not the conclusion of + ‚ E or ≠ · E, Cn is not the minor
premise of + ‚ E or ≠ · E, and for every i < n, Ci is minor premise of + ‚ E or
≠ · E and Ci+1 its conclusion.
(b) The length of a segment is the number of formula occurrences of which it consists,
its degree is their degree.
(c) A segment is maximal if and only if its last formula is major premise of an
elimination rule or premise of non-contradiction.
I will say that the formula occurrence Ci is on segment C1 . . . Cn. A segment is above
another one in a deduction if its last formula is above the other’s first formula. I
will speak of segments being the premises or conclusions of the rules of which their
last or first formulas are premises or conclusions.
Prawitz only counts a segment as maximal if it begins with the conclusion of
an introduction rule [19, 49]. The more general notion used here is also used by
Troestra and Schwichtenberg in the proof of normalisation for intuitionist logic [25,
179]. For philosophical reasons, the more general notion is called for, as it must
be ensured that + ‚ E and ≠ · E do not introduce grounds for the derivation of
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formulas that are not in balanced by the elimination rules for their main operators.
This is irrespective of how the first formula of the segment is derived.7
Definition 5. A deduction is in normal form if it contains neither maximal formulas
nor maximal segments.
The reduction steps to be given next remove maximal formulas and maximal seg-
ments from deductions. Applying then in the systematic fashion specified in the
proof of the normalisation theorem transforms any deduction into a deduction in
normal form. ; indicates that the deduction to its left or above it is transformed
into the deduction on its right or below it. I will call the deduction to which a
reduction step is applied the original deduction and the result of the application the




means that the deduction on top is used to conclude all formulas in the assumption
class [A].
(A) Permutative Reduction Steps for Maximal Segments
The lower application of the elimination rule or of non-contradiction is permuted
upwards to conclude with a minor premise of +‚E or ≠·I. Here are two examples,
the others being similar.
(1) The maximal segment consists of formula occurrences of the form + C ‚ D,
the last of which is concluded by ≠ · E:
 1
≠ A · B
[≠ A]i
 1
+ C ‚ D
[≠ B]j
 2
+ C ‚ D
i,j












≠ A · B
[≠ A]i
 1























7See [15, Ch 2] for more on these philosophical reasons.
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If some occurrence of „ forms part of a maximal segment in the original deduction,
the permutative reduction step increases its length in the reduced deduction. In the
proof of the normalisation theorem a strategy will be given to avoid increasing the
length of a maximal segment of the same or higher degree than the one shortened or
removed: in a nutshell, apply the reduction step to the rightmost segment of highest
degree first. Furthermore, it needs to be ensured that the reduction step does not
duplicate maximal formulas and segments of highest degree in  1 and  2: to do so
it is applied to a topmost maximal segment of highest degree, one above which there
is none other of highest degree.

































The reduction step shortens the right segment, but if the left premise of non-
contradiction is a maximal formula or the last formula of a segment, it duplicates
it. As – and –ú have the same degree, it needs to be ensured that the step actually
reduces the complexity of the deduction. So for the purpose of the proof of normali-
sation, the right premise of reductio will be counted as having a degree of one higher
than the left premise, if both premises are maximal. This decides the question to
which premise of reductio a reduction step is applied first in this and other cases.
(B) Reduction Steps for Maximal Formulas
(a) Reduction Steps for Maximal Formulas with Introduction and Elimination Rules
These are not essentially di erent from those for intuitionist logic given by Prawitz,
except that now a + or ≠ is carried along in front of formulas, and there are addi-
tional reduction steps for the signed negations of formulas. The reduction steps for
543
Nils Kürbis
maximal formulas of the forms + A ‚ B and ≠ A · B are similar to those Prawitz
gives for disjunctions, those for maximal formulas of the forms ≠ A‚B, + A·B and
≠ A ∏ B are similar to those Prawitz gives for conjunctions, those for maximal for-
mulas of the form + A ∏ B are similar to those Prawitz gives for implications, and
the reduction steps for maximal formulas of the forms + ¬A and ≠ ¬A are evident
enough. Applying such a reduction step may introduce new maximal formulas and
segments into the reduced deduction, but they are of lower degree than the maximal
formula removed from the original deduction. In cases of maximal formulas of the
form + A ∏ B, + A ‚ B and ≠ A · B, the reduced deduction may contain multiple
copies of subdeductions of the original deduction: to avoid multiplying maximal for-
mulas or segments of the same or higher degree than the one removed, in the proof
of the normalisation theorem the reduction steps are applied to maximal formulas of
highest degree such that no maximal formulas or segments of highest degree stand
above them or above the minor premises of the elimination rule of which they are
the major premises.
(b) Reduction Steps for Maximal Formulas with Reductio and Elimination Rules
In the first three reduction steps below, if + A or ≠ A is major premise of an
elimination rule or premise of non-contradiction in  , the reduction step introduces
a new r/e or r/nc maximal formula of lower degree than the one removed, which
presents no problem for the proof of normalisation. In the fourth case, a more
di cult issue arises.
(1) The r/e maximal formula has the form + A · B:
[≠ A · B]i
 
‹










If any occurrences of ≠ A · B in the assumption class [≠ A · B]i of the original
deduction are major premises of ≠ · E, then the reduction step introduces new
i/e maximal formulas into the reduced deduction that have the same degree as the
r/e maximal formula removed from the original deduction. Remove them as part
of the present reduction step by applying the reduction step for i/e formulas of
the form ≠ A · B to each of them immediately after the transformation above:
this creates at worst new maximal formulas of lower degree than the ones removed.
Similarly if any occurrences of ≠ A · B in the assumption class [≠ A · B]i of the
original deduction are premises of non-contradiction the other premise of which is
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also derived by an introduction rule: then new i/nc maximal formulas are introduced
into the deduction, which are removed immediately after the transformation above
as part of the step, and then, as the reduction procedures for such formulas to be
given below show, at worst maximal formulas of lower degree arise.
The case where + B has been derived by + · E is similar, and so are the cases
for r/e maximal formulas of the form ≠ A ‚ B.














As in case (1), the reduction step may introduce new i/e or i/nc maximal formulas
of the same degree as the r/e maximal formula removed, and this is dealt with in the
same way: apply the relevant reduction steps immediately after the transformation
above as part of the reduction step for r/e maximal formulas of the form ≠ ¬A.
The case for r/e maximal formulas of the form + ¬A is similar.
(3) There are three options for maximal formulas arising from reductio and
elimination rules for implication:
(i) The r/e maximal formula has the form + B ∏ A:
[≠ B ∏ A]i
 
‹







+ B [≠ A]i





The reduction step may introduce new i/e or i/nc maximal formulas of the same
degree as the r/e maximal formula removed, and this is dealt with as in previous
cases.
(ii) The r/e maximal formula has the form ≠ B ∏ A and ≠ A is concluded:
[+ B ∏ A]i
 
‹












The reduction step may introduce new i/e or i/nc maximal formulas of the same
degree as the r/e maximal formula removed, and this is dealt with as in previous
cases.
(iii) The r/e maximal formula has the form ≠ A ∏ B and + A is concluded:
[+ A ∏ B]i
 
‹













The reduction step may introduce new i/e or i/nc maximal formulas of the same
degree as the r/e maximal formula removed, and this is dealt with as in previous
cases.8
(4) The r/e maximal formula has the form + A ‚ B:
[≠ A ‚ B]i
 
‹

























8If non-contradiction is restricted to atomic premises, then the reduction step is incomplete:
if A is not atomic, the application of non-contradiction must be replaced by applications of non-
contradiction to atomic subformulas of A. This, however, poses no di culty, as A is of lower degree
than the r/e maximal formula removed.
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If – in the original deduction is ‹, non-contradiction is not applicable, but also not
necessary: conclude ≠ A and ≠ B directly by reductio in the reduced deduction.
The reduction step for r/e maximal formulas of the form ≠ A ‚ B is similar.
 1 and  2 get multiplied as many times as there are assumptions in assumption
class [≠ A ‚ B]i, so it must be ensured that when choosing a maximal formula
to which to apply the reduction step,  1 and  2 contain no maximal formulas or
segments of highest degree. The same strategy indicated for i/e maximal formulas
works here: choose a maximal formula of highest degree such that no maximal
formula or segment of highest degree stands above it or above the minor premises
of the elimination rule of which it is the major premise.
The reduction step may introduce new i/e or i/nc maximal formulas of the same
degree as the r/e maximal formula removed, and this is dealt with as in previous
cases. There are also three further cases to be considered.
First, if – is major premise of an elimination rule in  , the reduction step may
introduce an r/e maximal formula of unknown degree into the reduced deduction.
In that case, however, – is the last formula of a maximal segment in the original
deduction. To show that any deduction can be brought into one in normal form, the
proof of the normalisation theorem describes a method that systematically removes
all maximal formulas and segments from a deduction, beginning with those of highest
degree: thus if the reduction step is applied as part of this process, – cannot be of
higher degree than + A ‚ B. In the reduction steps for maximal segments and i/e
maximal formulas it was noted that they are applied to maximal formulas of highest
degree such that no maximal formulas of highest degree stand above them or the
minor premises of the rule of which they are major premises. We need to ensure
that in case the occurrence of – in   is the last formula of a maximal segment of
the same degree as + A‚B or forms part of such a maximal segment that continues
in  , then the relevant permutative reduction step is applied to the segment first.
The procedure indicated in the permutative reduction steps works here, too. If both
have no maximal formulas or segments of highest degree above them, we apply the
relevant reduction step to the rightmost one first, that is to one of which – forms
part in this case. It’ll be made more precise what ‘rightmost’ means in the proof of
the normalisation theorem.
Second, if – is the conclusion of reductio in  1 or  2, the reduction step may in-
troduce an r/nc maximal formula of unknown degree into the reduced deduction. In
that case, the application of non-contradiction in the reduced deduction is redundant
and dropped from the reduction step. For example, suppose the last application of a
rule in  1 is reductio. Then  1 has a subdeduction that derives ‹ from assumption
classes [+ A]i and [–ú], so conclude ≠ A directly by reductio, discharging formulas in
the assumption class [+ A]i, and assign the formulas in the assumption class [–ú] in
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 1 to the new assumption class iii and discharge them at the application of reductio
that concludes with the – on top of  . Similarly if the last application of a rule in
 2 is reductio, and if that is the last rule in both.
Third, if – is the last formula of a segment in  1 or  2, then the reduction step
introduces a new maximal segment into the deduction: remove it by permuting the
application of non-contradiction upwards as described in the permutative reduction
steps above as part of the reduction step. There remains one troublesome case
to be taken care of: if the first formula of the segment is concluded by reductio
in the original deduction, permuting non-contradiction upwards introduces an r/nc
maximal formula of unknown degree into the reduced deduction. A version of the
strategy of the previous paragraph works in this case, too. If the first formula of the
segment is derived by reductio, we already have a subdeduction  Õ1 of  1 of ‹ from
[+ A]i and [–ú] or a subdeduction  Õ2 of  2 of ‹ from [+ B]ii and [–ú]. So conclude
≠ A or ≠ B directly by reductio without the redundant step of non-contradiction
and assign the formulas in the assumption class [–ú] of  Õ1 or  Õ2 to assumption class
iii, discharging them at the lower application of reductio marked in the reduction
step. This leaves those assumptions in  Õ1 or  Õ2 undischarged that were discharged
by applications of + ‚ E or ≠ · E that gave rise to the segments in  1 or  2: so
insert these applications before continuing with  , using the conclusion – of the
lower application of reductio as the required minor premise. If – is on a segment in
 , this increases its length. But notice that such a segment is either not maximal or
of lower degree than the r/e maximal formula removed, by the choice of the strategy
of choosing maximal segments or formulas in the proof of normalisation.
(c) Reduction Steps for Maximal Formulas with Reductio and Non-Contradiction
There are two options to be considered.
(1) The assumption discharged by the application of reductio is not premise of
non-contradiction. I give as an example the case where the left premise of non-















If any of the formulas in the assumption class [+ A]i is the major premise of an
elimination rule in   and + A is the conclusion of an introduction rule or of reductio
in  , then the reduction step introduces i/e or r/e maximal formulas into the reduced
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deduction. However, in this case both premises of non-contradiction are maximal,
and the right one will be counted as one degree higher as the left one, and so the
maximal formula created by the reduction step is of lower degree than the one
removed. Similarly if + A is conclusion of + ‚ E or ≠ · E in   and any of the
formulas in the assumption class [+ A]i is major premise of an elimination rule in
 : the new maximal segment is of degree one lower than the formula removed.
If the situation is the mirror image of the one displayed and reductio concludes
the left premise of non-contradiction, then the right premise is not conclusion of an
elimination rule, as that one would be removed first.
(2) The assumption discharged by reductio is premise of non-contradiction, say





















This reduction step does only what it is supposed to do: it removes one maximal
formula and introduces no complications.
(d) Reduction Steps for Maximal Formulas with Introduction Rules and Non-Contra-
diction
Two examples should su ce, the other cases being similar or obvious.





+ A · B
 
≠ B

































Applying the reduction steps may introduce new maximal formulas into the reduced
deduction, but they are of lower degree than the maximal formulas removed from
the original deduction. Choice of maximal formula to which to apply the step avoids
duplicating maximal formulas of highest degree in  .
This completes the reduction steps for maximal formulas.
(C) Simplification Conversions
Applications of + ‚ E and ≠ · E with empty assumption classes are redundant and
may be removed from deductions.
This completes the description of the transformations of deductions applied in nor-
malisation.
The degree of a maximal formula or segment that is the right premise of reductio
the left premise of which is also a maximal formula or segment is the degree of the
formula (on the segment) plus 1. For all others, it is the degree of the formula (on the
segment). This also settles the question to which premise reduction steps for i/nc
maximal formulas are applied, although this is of comparatively minor significance.
Definition 6 (Rank of a Deduction). The rank of a deduction   is the pair Èd, lÍ
where d is the highest degree of any maximal formula or segment in  , and l is the
sum of the number of maximal formulas and the sum of the lengths of all maximal
segments in  . If there are no maximal formulas or segments in  , its rank is 0.
Ranks are ordered lexicographically: Èd, lÍ < ÈdÕ, lÕÍ i  either d < dÕ or d = dÕ and
l < lÕ.
As we have been rather explicit about the considerations necessary to ensure
that the complexity of a deduction is decreased in applying the reduction steps, the
proof of normalisation itself can thankfully be brief. All that remains is to explicate
the notion of a ‘rightmost’ maximal formula or segment. Here we follow Prawitz
[19, 50].
Theorem 1. Any deduction   of – from   in B can be brought into a deduction in
normal form of – from some of  .
Proof. By induction over the rank of deductions and applying the reduction steps.
Take a maximal formula or maximal segment of highest degree such that (i) no
maximal formula or segment of highest degree stands above it in the deduction, (ii)
no maximal formula or segment of highest degree stands above a minor premise of the
elimination rule of which the maximal formula or segment is the major premises,
and (iii) no maximal segment of highest degree contains a formula that is minor
premise of the elimination rule of which the maximal formula or maximal segment




There are at least two reasons why not everyone will be satisfied that the proof of
section 5 solves the philosophical problems of section 4:
(1) It appeals to non-contradiction in its general form.
(2) The definition of ‘maximal signed formula’ merely changes the topic.
Let’s look at each charge in turn
In reduction step (B.b.4), the one for r/e maximal formulas of the form + A ‚ B
and ≠ A · B, non-contradiction is applied to arbitrary formulas –. According to
Rumfitt, if – is not atomic, the inference from – and –ú to ‹ needs to be replaced by
applications of non-contradiction to atomic subformulas of –. The di culty is that
this may introduce new maximal formulas of unknown degree into the deduction.
Consider the construction that shows how to replace premises of the form C ‚ D by
C and D:
+ C ‚ D ≠ C ‚ D
‹
;
+ C ‚ D
i+ C








Suppose in the original deduction displayed in the reduction step (B.b.4), – is a
disjunction on a segment that is the conclusion of + ‚ I or ≠ · I. If this segment is
major premise of + ‚ E or ≠ · E or non-contradiction, all is fine: either – has lower
degree than ≠ A ‚ B or its segment is removed first. If it is not, however, then the
procedure for removing complex premises of non-contradiction introduces maximal
formulas of unknown degree into the reduced deduction.
The bilateralist who insists on restricting non-contradiction to atomic premises
requires a di erent proof of normalisation from the one given here. Alternatively, the
bilateralist could treat · and ‚ as defined in terms of ∏ and ¬. One might also won-
der whether the restriction of non-contradiction to atomic premises is an essential
element of bilateralism. It is according to Rumfitt, but the current considerations
may constitute a recommendation to drop it.
Another option that solves the problems of section 4 would be to restrict reductio
to atomic conclusions. Ferreira observes that once non-contradiction is restricted to
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atomic premises, there may be no good reason not to restrict reductio correspond-
ingly [4, ]. Rumfitt’s reasons for restricting non-contradiction seem to apply just
as well to reductio. Reductio is a rule of the same kind as non-contradiction, a
structural rule concerning the co-ordination of assertion and denial.
Ferreira shows, however, that the resulting logic is not classical and contains
neither + A ‚ ¬A nor ≠ A · ¬A as theorems. This may not be so much a defect
of bilateralism, as rather the surprising or interesting result that the correct logic of
bilateralism is not classical logic, but a constructive logic with strong negation. This
is the position for which Wansing argues [26, ]. The current considerations may add
support to this line of thought. It certainly has something to be said for it. It was
noted by Gibbard that dropping reductio and non-contradiction altogether from B
gives a constructive logic with strong negation [9]. Reading ≠ as ¬ and ignoring +,
it is Nelson’s logic of constructible falsity, also discussed by Prawitz [19, 96f]. While
Wansing’s logic adds further connectives, which require additional reduction steps,
the proof of section 5 also gives normalisation theorems for logics arising from B by
dropping non-contradiction and reductio or restricting both to atomic formulas.
In as much as bilateralism was supposed to justify classical logic, however, this
line of argument is problematic. Much of the motivation for bilateralism is to over-
come Dummettian objections to classical logic, in particular that the rules for classi-
cal negation are not stable. Many bilateralists will therefore prefer a di erent route
to excluding honk and conk.
Now for changing the subject. The requirement that r/e maximal formulas be
removable from deductions is rather di erent from the similar requirement on i/e
maximal formulas. The latter provides a formal criterion for fulfilment of Prawitz’s
inversion principle. Stability is a relation between the operational rules for a con-
nective, its introduction and elimination rules. The unilateral approach locates any
defects in rules for connectives in the operational rules governing them. The notion
of a maximal signed formula incorporates a relation between one rule and all elimi-
nation rules. That one rule is a structural rule, concerning the formal framework of
bilateralism, and so the notion of a maximal signed formula incorporates aspects of
a rather di erent kind than those on which proof-theoretic semantics was originally
built.
This objection does, I think, show something, but not that something is wrong
with the present notion of a maximal signed formula. It rather exhibits a short-
coming of bilateralism. There must obtain some balance in the inferential powers
of reductio and the other rules. If the rather obvious way of capturing that balance
employed here is objectionable, so much the worse for bilateralism.
Where I would agree is that the solution proposed here does not really go to the
heart of the matter of what is wrong with conk and honk. The problem with tonk
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lies in the mismatch of its introduction and elimination rules. One would expect a
comparable diagnosis of the problem with conk and honk from bilateralism: it lies
in a mismatch of their assertive and their rejective rules. Locating the problem with
conk and honk in reductio is not to the point. One should expect bilateral inversion
principles that provide a general basis on which to diagnose mismatch of operational
rules, just as the inversion principles in the unilateral context do, where these cut
across the divide of assertive and rejective rules.
7 Conclusion
The most promising solution to the problem of section 4 would be to formulate
a bilateral notion of stability that incorporates bilateral inversion principles and a
notion harmony between the assertive and the rejective rules of the connectives.
One proposal of how to do this has been formulated by Francez [5]. His no-
tion of vertical harmony holds between assertive introduction and elimination rules
and rejective introduction and elimination rules, while horizontal harmony holds
between assertive and rejective introduction rules. Francez modifies horizontal har-
mony slightly in a later paper, where it is also noted that it provides a notion of
harmony between rejective and assertive elimination rules [6]. Another proposal is
by the present author [14].9
There are, however, reasons to believe that adopting a bilateral notion of stability
would be counterproductive for the bilateralist.
In the unilateral framework, there are two aspects of the use, and thus meaning,
of the connectives in deductive arguments: one is captured by the introduction rules
and the other by the elimination rules for a connective. These aspects must be in
harmony, or more precisely stable, and satisfy the inversion principles. Following
Gentzen, the introduction rules for the connectives define their meanings, and the
elimination rules are consequences thereof. Following Dummett and Prawitz, they
are consequences in the sense that they are determined from the introduction rules
by the inversion principles. As stability is a requirement on rules that are to define
the meanings of the connectives completely, the process could be reversed and the
elimination rules taken as prior and the introduction rules determined from them.
Transpose this to the bilateral case. The motivating thesis of bilateralism is that
the meanings of the expressions of a language are determined by the conditions of
the correct assertibility and the correct deniability of sentences of which they form
part. The bilateralist agrees that stability must obtain between the introduction
9Both proposals allow the bilateralist to rule out the bilateral intuitionist logic of [12], the rules
of which, it must be admitted, are not as nicely symmetrical as those of B.
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and elimination rules for the connectives. Let’s follow Gentzen again and pick the
introduction rules as those that define the meaning of a connective, while its elimi-
nation rules are consequences of them by the bilateral notion of stability. honk and
conk show that we cannot simply lay down assertive and rejective introduction rules
for a connective. They, too, must be balanced by the bilateral notion of stability.
But this means that only one kind of introduction rules defines the meaning of the
connective, and the other is a consequence by bilateral stability.
In the absence of a principled way of deciding between the two kinds of intro-
duction rules, we might as well pick the assertive introduction rules as defining the
meanings of the connectives, all others being determined from them by bilateral
stability. And now the situation looks awkward for the bilateralist. The bilateralist
claims that the meanings of the connectives are defined by the assertive and rejective
rules governing them. A closer look into the matter reveals that they are defined by
the assertive introduction rules. That is exactly the thesis of the unilateralist. All
introduction rules of unilateral logic are assertive.
Nothing hangs on the choice of assertive introduction rules as defining meaning.
To rule out conk and honk, and to emulate the notion of stability of the unilateral
approach, the bilateralist needs inversion principles that determine the three other
sets of rules for a connective from any given one. Still, it is only one aspect of
the use of the connective that defines its meaning, the others being consequences
by stability, not two of them, as claimed by the bilateralist. It is not the assertive
rules in tandem with rejective rules that determine the meaning of a connective, but
only one half of one of those two aspects – either the assertive introduction rules,
or the assertive elimination rules, or the rejective introduction rules, or the rejective
elimination rules – the rest being determined by bilateral stability. Thus it looks as
if adopting a bilateral notion of stability means that the characteristically bilateral
thesis on how meanings are determined is e ectively abandoned, and bilateralism
collapses into a form of unilateralism.
This looks like a dilemma for bilateralists. Formulate a bilateral notion of stabil-
ity, or else face conk and honk. But if you do the former, face giving up bilateralism.
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